In this paper we propose a semantics in which the truth value of a formula is a pair of elements in a complete Boolean algebra. Through the semantics we can unify largely two proofs of cut-eliminability (Hauptsatz) in classical second order logic calculus, one is due to Takahashi-Prawitz and the other by Maehara. It seems to me that G. Takeuti's intention in the conjecture is to reduce or paraphrase the consistency problem of the second order arithmetic Z 2 = (Π 1 ∞ -CA) to a mathematical problem of cut-eliminability in the second order calculus G 1 LC, and the consistency of higher order arithmetic to the cuteliminability in the higher order calculus GLC.
Takeuti's fundamental conjecture G 1 LC defined in subsection 1.1 below is an impredicative sequent calculus with the (cut) rule for the second order logic. G 1 LC cf denotes the cut-free fragment of G 1 LC, and LK = G 0 LC the first order fragment.
(Takeuti's fundamental conjecture for the second order calculus G 1 LC [14] ) (cut) inferences are eliminable from proofs in G 1 LC: if G 1 LC proves a sequent, then it is provable without (cut).
It seems to me that G. Takeuti's intention in the conjecture is to reduce or paraphrase the consistency problem of the second order arithmetic Z 2 = (Π 1 ∞ -CA) to a mathematical problem of cut-eliminability in the second order calculus G 1 LC, and the consistency of higher order arithmetic to the cuteliminability in the higher order calculus GLC.
Some partial results are obtained on the conjecture. Takeuti [16] shows a cut-elimination theorem for a fragment of G 1 LC, and one for a fragment of the higher order calculus GLC in [17] , both of which implies the 1-consistency of the subsystem (Π 1 1 -CA) 0 of the second order arithmetic, the strongest one in the big five. In [1] a cut-elimination theorem for a fragment of G 1 LC is shown, which implies the 1-consistency of the subsystem (∆ 1 2 -CA+BI) of the second order arithmetic. All of these proofs in [16, 17, 1] are based on transfinite induction on computable notation systems of ordinals, and hence are ordinal-theoretically informative ones.
Although no proof of the full conjecture has been obtained as Takeuti had expected, the cut-eliminability holds for second order calculus. 
Moreover the cut-eliminability holds for higher order calculus GLC.
Theorem 1.2 [13, 9] GLC ⊢ Γ ⇒ ∆ ⇒ GLC cf ⊢ Γ ⇒ ∆ In this paper let us focus on the second order calculus for simplicity, and we propose a semantics in which the truth value of a formula is a pair of elements in a complete Boolean algebra. Through the semantics we can unify largely two proofs of cut-eliminability (Hauptsatz) in classical second order logic calculus, one is due to Takahashi-Prawitz and the other by Maehara. In Section 2 a soundness theorem 2.9 of G 1 LC is shown for semi valuations based on the semantics with pairs of elements in a complete Boolean algebra. Our proof of the theorem is essentially the same as in Takahashi [13] , Prawitz [9] and Maehara [6] . In Section 3 Theorem 1.1 is concluded.
In Section 4 a cBa B X ⊂ P(X) is introduced from a relation M on an arbitrary set X = ∅. The construction of the cBa B X is implicit in [6] . Theorem 1.1 is proved using a semi valuation defined from cut-free provability.
In Section 5 the proof theoretic strength of cut-eliminability is calibrated. It is well known that Theorem 1.1 is equivalent to the 1-consistency of Z 2 over a weak arithmetic. We sharpen it with respect to end sequents of proofs and fragments. Finally some open problems are mentioned.
Logic calculi
Let us recall second order sequent calculi briefly. Details are found in [18] .
Logical connectives are ¬, ∨, ∧, ∃, ∀. A second order language is obtained from a first order language by adding countably infinite n-ary variables X n i (i ∈ ω) for each n = 1, 2, . . .. For simplicity let us assume that our language contains no relation (predicate) symbol nor function symbol. Formulas are quantified by second order quantifiers ∃X n , ∀X n as well as first order quantifiers ∃x, ∀x. For a formula G and a list x = (x 1 . . . , x n ) of distinct variables, the expression λ x.G is an n-ary abstract or a term of second order, and denoted by T, . . .. T m 0 denotes the set of first order terms, and T m (n) 1 the set of n-ary abstracts λ x.G(x 1 , . . . , x n ).
For formulas F (X n ), F (λ x.G) denotes the formula up to renaming of bound variables, obtained from F by replacing each atomic formula X n (t 1 , . . . , t n ) by (λ x.G(x 1 , . . . , x n ))(T ) ≡ G(t 1 , . . . , t n ).
A finite set of formulas are said to be a cedent, denoted Γ, ∆, . . .. Γ, ∆ := Γ ∪ ∆, Γ, A := Γ ∪ {A}. A pair of cedents (Γ, ∆) is denoted Γ ⇒ ∆, and called a sequent. Γ is said to be the antecedent, ∆ succedent of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆.
A sequent calculus G 1 LC is a logic calculus for the second order logic. Its initial sequents are A, Γ ⇒ ∆, A (A:atomic)
Inference rules are first order ones (L¬), (R¬), (L∨), (R∨), (L∧), (R∧),
where F is the minor formula, and ¬F the major formula of the inference rules (L¬), (R¬).
where i ∈ {0, 1}, F 0 , F 1 are the minor formula, and F 0 ∨ F 1 the major formula of the inference rules (L∨), (R∨).
where i ∈ {0, 1}, F 0 , F 1 are the minor formula, and F 0 ∧ F 1 the major formula of the inference rules (L∧), (R∧).
where in (L∃ 0 ), (R∀ 0 ), a is an eigenvariable which does not occur in the lower sequent, and F (a) is the minor formula. In (R∃ 0 ), (L∀ 0 ), t is a first order term, and F (t) is the minor formula. ∃xF (x) is the major formula of the inference rules (L∃ 0 ), (R∃ 0 ), and ∀xF (x) the major formula of the inference
There is no minor nor major formula of (cut) inference. Rules for second order quantifications (
.
where in (L∃ 1 ), (R∀ 1 ), Y is an eigenvariable which does not occur in the lower sequent, and F (Y ) is the minor formula. In (R∃ 1 ), (L∀ 1 ), T is an n-ary second order term, and F (T ) is the minor formula. ∃XF (X) is the major formula of the inference rules (L∃ 1 ), (R∃ 1 ), and ∀XF (X) the major formula of the inference rules (L∀ 1 ), (R∀ 1 ). Since cedents here are finite sets of formulas, there are no explicit structural rules, weakening (or thinning), contraction nor exchange in our sequent calculi.
Valuations
In this section let us propose a semantics in which the truth value of a formula is a pair of elements in a complete Boolean algebra, and a soundness theorem 2.9 of G 1 LC is shown for semi valuations based on the semantics. For a cBa (complete Boolean algebra) B let DB denote the set of pairs (a, b) of elements a, b ∈ B such that a ≤ b. Here D stands for the axiom D : ✷A → ✸A in the modal logic. −a denotes the complement of a ∈ B.
Definition 2.1 For a cBa B let
Each a ∈ DB is written a = (✷a, ✸a), where ✷a ≤ ✸a. For a, b ∈ DB let
Then for {a λ } λ ⊂ DB, the following hold.
Obviously DB is a complete lattice under the order ≤ as well as under the order ✁. Note that a ✂ b ⇔ (✷a → ✷b) = (✸b → ✸a) = 1, where (a → b) := sup{−a, b} for a, b ∈ B.
For example for B = 2 = {0, 1}, D2 is the set of three truth values 3 := D2 = {f, u, t} = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, where f < u < t and u ✁ f, t.
and
a non-empty set of functions α : D n 0 → DB for each n = 1, 2, . . .
introduce an n-ary relation constantᾱ, and each t ∈ D 0 is identified with the individual constant for t. For formulas A and n-ary abstracts λ x.G(x 1 , . . . , x n ) with t ∈ D 0 andᾱ, let us define recursively
Intuitively M(A) = (a, b) means that the degree of truth of A is a, and one of non-falsity of A is b. When B = 3, ✷M(A) = 1 [✸M(A) = 1] is related to the fact that !A is valid [?A is valid] in a three-valued structure for Girard's three-valued logic with modal operators !, ? in [5] , resp. For α, β :
Recall that T m 0 denotes the set of first order terms, and T m (n) 1 the set of n-ary abstracts λ x.G(x 1 , . . . , x n ). Definition 2.4 Let V be a map from the set of formulas A to DB, A → V (A) ∈ DB. V is said to be a semi DB-valuation if it enjoys the following conditions:
Definition 2.5 Let
A B-valued model N is a pair (D 0 , I) such that D 0 is a non-empty set, I = I 
where 1 denotes the largest element in B.
Proposition 2.6 Let B be a cBa.
Proof.
(1): This is seen by induction on formulas F (X) using Proposition 2.2. For example consider the case F (X) ≡ (∃Y k G(Y, X)). By the induction hy-
1 , X ∈ I (n) and formulas F (X n ), the following hold:
and N |= 2CA (4)
: This is seen by induction on formulas F (X). The case when F (X) is an atomic formula X(t 1 , . . . , t n ) is seen from the assumption α✂X . Other cases follow from Proposition 2.2. For example consider the case
By the induction hypothesis we have
and Y ∈ I (k) with β ✂Y. On the other hand we have Let
. . , t n )) for t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ T m 0 , and
and N |= 2CA (6) 3 Semi valuation through proof search
It is easy to conclude Theorem 1.1 from Theorem 2.9 and the following Lemma 3.1. This is the proof by Takahashi [13] and Prawitz [9] .
Proof. By a canonical proof search, we get an infinite binary tree of sequents supposing
Pick an infinite path through the tree. Let us define formulas occurring in antecedents of the path to be t, formulas occurring in succedents to be f. This results in a semi valuation 
Semi valuation defined from cut-free provability
In this section following Maehara [6] , a cBa B X ⊂ P(X) is first introduced from a relation M on an arbitrary set X = ∅. M is a symmetric relation such that if (x, x) ∈ M , then (x, y) ∈ M for any y ∈ X. The construction of the cBa B X is implicit in [6] . Second the Hauptsatz for G 1 LC is concluded using a semi valuation defined from cut-free provability as in [6] .
It seems to me that Maehara' s proof compares more straightforward with the proof in Section 3 due to Takahashi-Prawitz in the sense that the latter proves the contraposition of the Hauptsatz. The cost we have to pay is to elaborate a cBa from relations in Subsection 4.1, which gives an inspiration to researches in non-classical logics, e.g., cf. [3] .
complete Boolean algebras induced from relations
Let X = ∅ be a non-empty set, and M : X ∋ x → M (x) ⊂ X a map. Assume M enjoys the following two conditions for any x, y ∈ X:
Then let
In the following we consider only subsets of the set X. Let ∅ := X.
Proof. Let β = {γ ∈ B X : α ⊂ γ}, and
, and hence δ ∈ B X . We show δ ⊂ β. Assume α ⊂ γ ∈ B X and γ ⊂ M (x). Then α ⊂ M (x). Hence δ ⊂ M (x), and δ ⊂ {M (x) : γ ⊂ M (x)} = γ. Thus δ ⊂ β. ✷ Theorem 4.2 B X is a cBa with the following operations for α, β ∈ B X , and {M (x) : x ∈ X} ⊂ B X .
, and β ⊂ M (x). Hence β ⊂ α λ0 . We obtain β ⊂ λ α λ , and hence β ∈ B X . Therefore inf λ α λ = λ α λ . On the othe side we see sup λ α λ = {γ ∈ B X : λ α λ ⊂ γ} from Lemma 4.1. 4.2.3. Let y ∈ {M (x) : −α ⊂ M (x)}, and x ∈ α. Then −α ⊂ M (x), and y ∈ M (x). Hence y ∈ {M (x) : −α ⊂ M (x)} ⇒ y ∈ −α. This means −α ∈ B X .
Next we show
Assume α ⊂ M (x) and y ∈ α. Then y ∈ M (x), and x ∈ M (y) by (8) . Thus
Finally we show sup{α, −α} = X. Let α, −α ⊂ β ∈ B X . If β ⊂ M (x), then by (9) we have x ∈ −α ⊂ M (x). (7) 
semi valuation induced from relation
In what follows let X = S be the set of all sequents.
It is clear that the map S ∋ x → M (x) ⊂ S enjoys (7) and (8). (7) follows from the contraction and weakening (thinning) rules, while (8) is seen from the exchange rule, all of these rules are implicit in our calculus G 1 LC cf . Let B S ⊂ P(S) be the cBa induced by the map, cf. Theorem 4.2. We have for sequents 
The conditions of the ✸ are seen from the right rules.
1 } is seen from the rule (R∀ 2 ). ✸V (¬A) ⊃ ✸(−V (A)): By (10) and the rule (R¬), we obtain
The conditions for ✷ are seen from the left rules using (10) in Proposition 4.3.
1 }, which follows from the rule (L∃ 2 ). 
Proof-theoretic strengths
In the final section let us calibrate proof theoretic strengths of cut-eliminability. For a class Φ of sequents CE Φ (G 1 LC) denotes the statement that any G 1 LCprovable sequent in Φ is provable without the (cut) rule. When Φ is the set of all sequents, let CE(
. IΣ 1 denotes the fragment of the first-order arithmetic in which the complete induction schema is restricted to Σ 
). This is shown in [15] as follows. Argue in IΣ 1 .
Let L 2 denote the class of lower elementary recursive functions. The class of functions contains the zero, successor, projection and modified subtraction functions and is closed under composition and summation of functions. L 2 * denotes the class of lower elementary recursive relations. Then it is easy, cf. [10] to see that the class L 2 * is closed under boolean operations and bounded quantifications, each function in L 2 is bounded by a polynomial, and the truth definition of atomic formulas R(x 1 , . . . , x n ) for R ∈ L 2 * is elementary recursive. Suppose that Z 2 ⊢ ∃x R for a Σ 0 1 -sentence ∃x R with an R ∈ L 2 * . In the Z 2 -proof, restrict each first-order quantifier ∀x, ∃x to ∀x ∈ N, ∃x ∈ N, where N(a) :≡ ∀X(X(0) ∧ ∀y(X(y) ⊃ X(Sy)) ⊃ X(a)) with the successor function S, and ∃x ∈ N B :↔ (∃x (N(x) ∧ B) ), etc. Let us denote the restriction of a formula A by A N . The comprehension axiom (CA) ∃X∀y(X(y) ↔ G(y)) follows from (R∃ 1 ). Complete induction schema follows ∀a ∈ N∀X(X(0) ∧ ∀y ∈ N (X(y) ⊃ X(Sy)) ⊃ X(a)). We obtain a G 1 LC-proof of a sequent Eq N , A N 0 ⇒ ∃x ∈ N R for an axiom A 0 of finitely many constants for functions in L 2 and the equality axiom Eq :⇔ (∀X∀x, y(x = y → (X(x) ↔ X(y)))). A 0 is a universal formula ∀x 1 , . . . , x n Q with a Q ∈ L 2 * . Thus we obtain a G 1 LC-proof of the sequent Eq, A 0 ⇒ ∃x R.
Next let E(a) :⇔ (∀X∀y(a = y → (X(a) ↔ X(y)))), and restrict each first-order quantifier ∀x, ∃x occurring in the G 1 LC-proof to ∀x ∈ E, ∃x ∈ E. Then we obtain a G 1 LC-proof of the sequent Eq E , A 0 ⇒ ∃x R, where Eq E ⇔ (∀X∀x, y ∈ E(x = y → (X(x) ↔ X(y)))), which is provable. Hence we obtain a G 1 LC-proof of the sequent A 0 ⇒ ∃x R. Now by CE Σ 0 1 (G 1 LC), i.e., the cuteliminability from the proof with Σ 0 1 -end sequents, we get
Then we see that ∃x R is true.
Although this is a folklore, cf. [5] , let us show it briefly.
It suffices to show in Z 2 , the cut-eliminability from each proof P of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ since the statement CE(
In what follows argue in Z 2 , and consider the Takahashi-Prawitz' proof in Section 3 for simplicity. First observe that Lemma 3.1 of the existence of a semi 3-valuation V is provable
In Lemma 2.10 the satisfaction relation N |= F in the 2-model N = (D 0 , I) is second-order definable for each formula F . Then for each formulas F (X n ) and G(x 1 , . . . , x n , X), we have v(T ) ✂ X ⇒ v(F (T )) ✂ N (F (X )) and N (∀X∃Y n ∀x 1 , . . . , x n (Y (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ↔ G(x 1 , . . . , x n , X))) = 1. This suffices to evaluate the truth values of formulas occurring in the proof P , and N (Γ ⇒ ∆) = 0. Hence P is not a G 1 LC-proof of the sequent Γ ⇒ ∆. A contradiction. ✷
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5.1 indirectly. Here is a direct proof. P. Päppinghaus [8] shows that Let Γ ⇒ ∆ be a Π 1 -sequent. Erase each second-order quantifier ∀X, ∃Y in the sequent to get a first-order sequent Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 . It is easy to see that if
of first-order sequents.
Next let H ∈ Σ 0 1 be an Herbrand normal form of the first-order formula Γ 0 ⊃ ∆ 0 . Then again it is easy to see that if
Let us mention a refinement for fragments. Π 1 n denotes the class of formulas G ≡ (∀X 1 ∃X 2 · · · QX n A) with a first-order matrix A, and Q = ∀ when n is odd,
An inspection to the proof of Theorem 5.1 shows the following. Note that N(a) as well as E(a) is a Π 1 1 -formula without second-order free variable. To state the next problem we need first some definitions.
Definition 5.4
1. An inference rule is said to be reducible if there is a minor formula A of the inference rule such that either the formula A is in the antecedent and the sequent ⇒ A is provable, or A is in the succedent and the sequent A ⇒ is provable.
2. A proof P enjoys the pure variable condition if in P , a free variable occurs in a sequent other than the end-sequent, then it is an eigenvariable of an inference rule J and the variable occurs only in the upper part of the inference rule J. It is easy to see that Mints' normal form theorem for G 1 LC implies the 2-consistency of the second-order arithmetic Z 2 as follows. Assume that Z 2 ⊢ ∃x∀y R(x) for a false Σ 0 2 -sentence ∃x∀y R(x). Let Ind :⇔ (∀a N(a) ). Then G 1 LC ⊢⇒ ∃x(Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(x)) for a true Π 0 1 -sentence A 0 . Pick an irreducible proof P of the sequent ⇒ ∃x(Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(x)) in G 1 LC. Then for a closed term t the last inference must be a right rule (R∃ 0 ):
⇒ ∃x(Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(y)), Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(t) ⇒ ∃x(Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(y)) (R∃ 0 )
From the Σ 0 1 -completeness, we see for the false Π 0 1 -sentence ∀yR(t), that there exists a proof of the sequent Eq ∧ Ind ∧ A 0 ⊃ ∀y R(t) ⇒ even in the weak fragment BC of G 1 LC defined in p.166, [18] , in which the abstracts T in the inference rules (R∃ 1 ), (L∀ 1 ) are restricted to variables and predicate constants. This means that P is reducible. A contradiction.
Cut-elimination by absorption in [8] is useless to prove the Mints' normal form theorem since in
⇒ ∀X(X ⊃ X) as well as ⇒ A ⊃ A is provable, and both inferences (L∀ 1 ) and (L ⊃) are reducible.
A proof of Mints' normal form theorem hold for LK in [2] runs as follows. Assume that a sequent Γ 0 ⇒ ∆ 0 has no irreducible proof. By a proof search, we get an infinite binary tree of sequents, where we don't analyze, e.g., a succedent formula ∃x A(x) for a term t when its instance A(t) can be refuted, i.e., A(t) ⇒ is provable. Γ ⇒ ∆, ∃x A(x), A(t)
. . . .
A(t) ⇒ Γ ⇒ ∆, ∃x A(x)
Pick an infinite path P through the tree. Let P a [P s ] denote the set of formulas occurring in an antecedent [occurring in a succedent] of a sequent on the path P, resp. Let atomic formulas in P a to be true, and atomic formulas in P s to be false. From the truth values of atomic formulas define a first-order structure M. 2 Then we see by induction on formulas A that if A ∈ P a , then M |= A, and if A ∈ P s , then M |= A. In the case of unanalyzed formula as above, M |= A(t) follows from the soundness of the calculus LK for any first-order structures M.
An obstacle in extending this proof to G 1 LC lies in the fact that we need first prove (5) , and then (6) follows from (5) in the proof of Lemma 2.10. However in proving (5) for an infinite path obtained from a search tree with respect to the non-existence of irreducible proof, we need the soundness of G 1 LC for 2-models N , but the soundness holds only if the model N enjoys the Comprehension axiom. In other words we need (6) before we prove (5), and we are in a circle.
